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Abstract—The Space Shuttle program is ending and elements
of the Constellation Program are either being cancelled or
transitioned to new NASA exploration endeavors. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has worked
diligently to select an optimum configuration for the Space
Launch System (SLS), a heavy lift vehicle that will provide the
foundation for future beyond low earth orbit (LEO) large-scale
missions for the next several decades. Thus, multiple questions
must be addressed: Which heavy lift vehicle will best allow
the agency to achieve mission objectives in the most affordable
and reliable manner? Which heavy lift vehicle will allow for a
sufficiently flexible exploration campaign of the solar system?
Which heavy lift vehicle configuration will allow for minimizing
risk in design, test, build and operations? Which heavy lift
vehicle configuration will be sustainable in changing political
environments?
Seeking to address these questions drove the development of an
SLS decision-making framework. From Fall 2010 until Spring
2011, this framework was formulated, tested, fully documented,
and applied to multiple SLS vehicle concepts at NASA from
previous exploration architecture studies. This was a multistep
process that involved performing figure of merit (FOM)-based
assessments, creating Pass/Fail gates based on draft threshold
requirements, performing a margin-based assessment with sup-
porting statistical analyses, and performing sensitivity analysis
on each. This paper discusses the various methods of this
process that allowed for competing concepts to be compared
across a variety of launch vehicle metrics. The end result was
the identification of SLS launch vehicle candidates that could
successfully meet the threshold requirements in support of the
SLS Mission Concept Review (MCR) milestone.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The decision for a new heavy-lift launch vehicle is rooted in
the 2005 Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS),
which reinvigorated serious interest in a national heavy-lift
capability. The Constellation Program (CxP), formed in
response to the ESAS, established long duration exploration
missions to the Moon and eventually Mars, which involved
launching high-volume, large mass payloads into low earth
orbit (LEO). The Ares V launch vehicle served the heavy
lift need of the CxP and underwent multiple design concept
studies and design analysis cycles between 2007 and 2010.
As CxP was recommended for cancellation in early 2010,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
conducted several internal studies on heavy-lift vehicle archi-
tectures capable of performing a wide range of missions at
reduced cost and schedule. The studies, most notably the
Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) study and the Heavy-
Lift Propulsion Technology (HLPT) study, identified several
families of launch vehicles whose features were distinguished
by the number of stages, types of solid and liquid propulsion
systems, and outer mold line (OML) design characteristics.
These families included both side-mount and in-line config-
urations, 27.6-foot and 33-foot OML diameters, 1.5 thru 3
stages, multiple booster options, and a wide range of liquid
propulsion engines and solid rocket motor options.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was passed by both
the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate and was
signed by the President on October 11, 2010. This Act
directed NASA to develop a Space Launch System (SLS)
capable of delivering crew and heavy cargo to LEO and
beyond. As its initial capability, the SLS must be capable of
lifting 70 metric tons of payload to LEO. A full capability of
130 metric tons is achieved with the addition of a combined
Upper and Earth Departure Stage to the initial configuration.
With national stakeholder needs passed into law and various
vehicle options to chose from, NASA George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) established a team to develop
a decision-making framework in which to communicate ef-
fectively with agency decision-makers the characteristics and
relative merits of the likely vehicle candidates. This frame-
work will be summarized in this paper, with a specific focus
on the methods themselves rather than the results produced.
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2. APPROACH
The team set out to establish a process by which the SLS
Steering Committee could identify vehicle candidates that
could meet documented NASA Mission Concept Review
(MCR) success criteria. The process involved establishing
a standardized set of process inputs, each of which have
their own documented set of groundrules and assumptions.
These standardized input sets and associated analytical pro-
cesses were in the areas of performance, cost, and reliability
estimation. By forming a common set of groundrules and
assumptions for all discipline areas and associated teams, a
consistent set of vehicle data was produced that would allow
for relative comparisons to be made across many vehicle
concepts.
As with most complex problems, it is very difficult to define
a single methodology or process that will identify a clearly
attractive candidate from a multitude of options. Therefore,
the decision team set out to define a multifactored process
that would allow the problem to be assessed from a variety
of angles. This process (as shown in Figure 1) includes the
following steps:
FOM-Based Assessment with figure of merit (FOM)s and
criteria established from stakeholder metrics in the areas of
performance, schedule, programmatics, and affordability.
Draft SLS Level 1 Requirements assessment with all con-
cepts evaluated on a pass or fail basis against the minimum
threshold values across a variety of metrics.
Aggregate Margin Assessment which compares all vehicle
concepts to the draft Level 1 requirements and their margin
with respect to each. This also includes supporting statistical
analysis on the same metrics.
3. FOM-BASED ASSESSMENT
Stakeholders in the SLS Decision
In the heavy-lift vehicle decision process, the early estab-
lishment of an agreed upon set of FOMs derived from the
stakeholders in the decision is imperative. In this manner, the
stakeholders are widely represented in the decision-making
process, and the resulting vehicle decision is based on this
representation rather than other external factors. Further-
more, it provides a standard method for measuring and
comparing competing concepts rather than independently
assessing and potentially eliminating competitors without a
larger-view of the trade environment.
For NASA, the decision making process is fairly straightfor-
ward. The NASA Administrator, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) provides input to the President on existing
and potential NASA programs. The President proposes new
programs and/or the continuation of existing NASA programs
in the annual Presidential Budget Request to Congress. The
Congress debates the merits of the proposed programs and
either chooses to authorize the programs or not. These
authorized programs are then funded through the appropri-
ations process. In the simplest case, the conglomeration of
proposed, authorized, and appropriated programs are then
passed and signed into law as the Nations Omnibus Spending
Bill. This mutual agreement between the President and the
Congressional Authorization and Appropriations processes
are the general framework by which national decisions are
made.
Therefore, the Stakeholders for this decision are defined as
the President of the United States, both the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate, and the NASA resources
tasked with carrying out the authorized, approved, and funded
program.
Stakeholder Derived Metrics
Determining the priorities of these stakeholders and the rela-
tive importance of those priorities relative to one another is a
more difficult task. The process used for this assessment was
as follows:
• Gather statements made by the stakeholders through their
respective publications.
• Bin those statements into general FOM categories.
• Reduce similar statements into a single sub-FOM or what
could potentially be termed heavy-life vehicle Needs, Goals,
and Objectives (NGO).
• Perform a first-order prioritization of those NGOs within
the FOM categories.
The first step of this process is merely collecting statements
regarding the HLLV made by the President in the FY2011
Presidential Budget Request and subsequent amendments
thereof (speech at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on April
15th, 2010), as well as the Senate and House of Representa-
tive Authorization Acts and Appropriations Reports. These
statements were documented as “Quotes” associated with
each source.
For instance, individual quotes from these sources at the time
of this study as it relates to the development schedule of the
heavy-lift vehicle program are:
President’s Speech at Kennedy Space Center on April 15th,
2010: “And we will finalize a rocket design no later than 2015
and then begin to build it.”
U.S. House of Representatives NASA Authorization Act
(HR 5781): “...the Administrator shall strive to meet the goal
of having the heavy lift launch vehicle authorized in this
paragraph available for operational missions by the end of
the current decade”
U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Report: Not
available at the time of this study
U.S. Senate NASA Authorization Act (S.3729): “...Priority
should be placed on the core elements with the goal for
operational capability for the core elements not later than
December 31, 2016.”
U.S. Senate Appropriations Report: “...The Committee in-
vests in a new heavy lift rocket to be built by 2017, along with
the Orion capsule to carry astronauts, so NASA can again
send humans on new journeys of discovery.”
Organization and Simplification of Stakeholder Priorities
The compilation of statements by the stakeholders was then
organized in matrix format based on the general FOM areas
that they targeted. These eventual general FOM areas found
were Performance, Schedule, Programmatics, and Afford-
ability aspects. Fortunately, several statements that were
extracted were closely related with slight nuances between
them. This led to a high level integration of closely related
FOMs into what became known internally as “Integrated
FOMs”. These Integrated FOMs, if moved forward into the
environment of a NASA program, may be considered draft
NGOs for the new Heavy-Lift Vehicle program. That is,
they are NGOs by which vehicle level requirements may be
derived from (e.g. integrated vehicle shall deliver 70 metric
tons to LEO).
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Figure 1. Decision Analysis Process
Once consolidated into the “Integrated FOMs” or NGOs, a
high-level ranking of the NGOs was performed in order to
reduce the quantity even further. A simple High, Medium, or
Low priority was assigned to each NGO with an associated
stakeholder that considers it to be of that priority. This
technique was used to eliminate NGOs from the assessment
which were medium or low in priority. This process resulted
in all stakeholder priorities being distilled down into 16
NGOs. Four of these were universally agreed to, three were
unique to the Presidential priorities, five were unique to the
Congressional priorities, and four were additional derived
priorities. Figure 2 lists these NGOs.
FOM Weightings
With the four FOMs (Performance, Schedule, Programmat-
ics, and Affordability) and the criteria that composes the
FOMs established (Figure 2), the team proceeded to weight
the FOMs. A commonly used technique to systematically
work through complex decisions is the Analytical Hierarchy
Process (AHP). This technique works by decomposing a par-
ticular decision involving multiple variables into its individ-
ual components and then comparing those two components
independently of all other considerations.
In this case, the individual FOMs are compared on a one-
to-one basis to determine relative importance of one vs. the
other. For instance, the four FOMs as listed are compared in
an independent fashion systematically by answering six basic
questions:
• Is Performance more important than Affordability?
• Is Performance more important than Schedule?
• Is Performance more important than Programmatics?
• Is Affordability more important than Schedule
• Is Affordability more important than Programmatics?
• Is Schedule more important than Programmatics?
These six questions are answered on a yes or no basis with
a relative magnitude associated with that yes or no. A
comparative matrix is composed and once completed, all
values are normalized within each FOM category so that a
Figure 2. Final Stakeholder Derived Priorities
relative comparison can be made between them. This results
in an AHP factor that demonstrates the relative strength in
scoring of a particular factor over all others. The AHP factor
itself can be used directly as a weighting factor in most
circumstances. An easier to interpret method is to derive the
percentage (out of a 100% total) that one factor holds over all
others. This is merely the percentage of the AHP factor that
one FOM accounts for divided by the total available AHP
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factors. Through this AHP process, the FOM weightings for
Performance, Schedule, Programmatics, and Affordability are
found as shown in Figure 3 (based on a 100% total available):
Figure 3. AHP Determined FOM Weightings
NGO Scoring Criteria and Final Assessment
Once the weighting of each FOM is found, it is imperative
to set up a scoring method for each individual NGO. In
this manner, data is measured using a consistently-applied
process across a variety of vehicle concepts. For this as-
sessment, NGO definitions (for the NGOs shown in Figure
2) were agreed upon and documented. However, each NGO
represents a certain type of data. For instance, performance
represents a calculated payload mass to a certain orbit.
Cost metrics represents a cost estimate of some sort for a
given configuration, schedule and flight manifest. Schedule
represents a development timeline found through a critical
path assessment and so on. These aforementioned examples
represent standardized, quantifiable data sources. In this
assessment, there are also a multitude of data that represents
subjective, hard-to-quantify NGOs. Examples of this data
type include workforce transition, life-cycle cost reduction
challenges, and others. Therefore, a standardized scoring
methodology is established for these particular attributes.
Additionally, it is required that all NGOs are measured ap-
propriately. Two data conditioning steps must be undertaken
to ensure a representative outcome:
1) Ensure singular NGO quantities do not dominate the final
consolidated measurement
2) Ensure a large quantity of NGOs in a single FOM does
not cause that FOM to dictate the results (regardless of the
application of weighting factors)
Whereas some NGOs are on the scale of tens or hundreds,
other NGOs are on the scale of billions. It is apparent
that a simple summation of these would result in the value
represented by the lower scale having very little impact in
the overall outcome. The method used to avoid this issue
is a simple normalization between a fixed lower and upper
boundary. For instance, performance is measured on the order
of metric tons. A given range for performance may be a
desired performance between 70 to 130 metric tons. By fixing
a common lower boundary at the minimum in the range and
a common upper boundary at the maximum of the range, all
additional values can be interpolated between those two fixed
points. If this process is repeated across all NGOs, then all
are measured on a common scale.
The second data conditioning technique used for this assess-
ment is averaging within a single FOM category to avoid the
quantity of NGOs within a single FOM from dictating the
outcome. It is apparent that if all NGOs were merely summed
for the final results, Affordability would dominate the final
outcome based on the quantity of Affordability metrics within
the assessment. Therefore, before application of any weight-
ing factors, all Affordability NGOs are summed and divided
by the quantity of Affordability NGOs (by stakeholder) to
produce an average Affordability subtotal (by stakeholder and
total). An important point about this technique is that this
dictates that all NGOs are weighted equally within a single
FOM. Once these data conditioning steps are applied, vehicle
data can be imported and scoring comparisons can be made
on any number of launch vehicle concepts.
4. DRAFT SLS REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT
One particular shortfall of the FOM Based Assessment is that
is does not capture how well the individual vehicles perform
against the draft SLS Level 1 requirements as established
by the SLS Steering Committee in November 2010. An
assessment to these individual threshold values gives a much
better indication of which vehicle concepts have the ability to
meet standard NASA MCR success criteria based on eventual
vehicle level requirements in all categories (cost, schedule,
performance, reliability, etc.). In order to provide this insight,
each individual requirement was given to the Requirements
Analysis Cycle (RAC) teams as “Draft Threshold Require-
ments” and “Draft Objective Requirements” across a variety
of metrics. All of these threshold values, if levied as program
requirements, must be met in order to be considered a feasible
vehicle concept for SLS MCR. With this “Pass or Fail”
criteria established, the vehicle data can then be applied to
determine areas where the individual vehicle families fall
short of these minimal “Threshold” values. Alternatively,
vehicle concepts meeting most or all of these “Threshold”
values should be considered feasible vehicles for the purposes
of a MCR. This process is further depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4. MCR Feasible Vehicle Identification Process
5. AGGREGATE MARGIN STUDY WITH
SUPPORTING STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
System Margin Assessment
At the inception of the SLS program, a measure of the
“weighted system margin” is a very important metric that
should be given appropriate thought when determining the
preferred vehicle approach. While it is very difficult to
quantify certain subjective aspects of the impending vehicle
decision, the quantitative categories are easily binned accord-
ing the level of “goodness” that each concept provides. These
normalization bins give a relative measure of how much
margin each vehicle concepts provides within the metrics
established (with both the threshold and objective values
considered). In addition, the weighting factors as currently
understood can easily be applied to these quantitative metrics,
resulting in a weighted system margin calculation.
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Parametric Assessment of Vehicle FOMs
To support the assessment of the vehicle parameter space and
to enable the incorporation of uncertainty and constraints in
the assessment methodology, a parametric and probabilistic
Monte Carlo assessment of the RAC configurations was com-
pleted. This assessment leveraged the work done by the RAC
cycle and applied uncertainty on each of the FOMs for each
of the vehicles. To complete the assessment, the following
cases were assessed:
1) Integrated vehicle assessment using multiple FOM
weightings to assess sensitivity of the recommended optimal
architecture to changes in FOM weighting
2) Integrated vehicle assessment with sequential application
of minimal requirements
a) Performance (to standard orbit)
b) Safety and Reliability (LOC/LOM)
c) Cost (total development, near term, and recurring cost)
d) Schedule (first flight)
3) Integrated vehicle assessments with varying level of un-
certainties on each of the FOMs
The assessments were completed using reference vehicles
that were defined using the draft SLS Level 1 requirements
from the RAC process. Figure 5 depicts generic results of
these Monte Carlo runs when implementing the Cost, Safety,
and Performance gates. It can be interepreted as a probabilis-
tic assessment of how many times out of all ran cases that the
given configuration meets all levied requirement gates. The
results from this assessment illustrates the sensitivity of the
“optimal vehicle” to the applied constraints.
Figure 5. Parametric Assessment Sample Results
6. CONCLUSION
The framework that was developed allowed for vehicle con-
cepts and associated architectures to be compared on a variety
of levels. These include the ability of the configurations to
meet stakeholder needs, goals, and objectives, ability to meet
SLS programmatic requirements (or requirement changes),
and ability to provide margin to the program that will result in
SLS having the ability to maintain both national and internal
performance, schedule, and affordability targets. Combined,
this multifactored assessment selected vehicles that would
have the ability to successfully pass NASA MCR success
criteria. Furthermore, the output of the framework was vetted
by agency and national leadership. In this manner, it provided
insight and confidence to agency decision-makers that the
SLS concept chosen for further development will be a very
flexible and capable vehicle that should serve the needs of a
nation in its human space exploration endeavours for decades
to come.
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